With 153 members and thousands of products, the easiest way to do this is the Sorgimulion for discounts. These formulas are at the heart of the “modalities.” Once agreed, governments will be able to apply the formulas to their tariffs and subsidies to set new caps. 12 All business is that the overall picture of cluster analysis is rather similar to previous analyses. The least liberal groups of countries are clusters 8 – the EU and Israel, and clusters 5 and 7. Most of the Cairns group is in Cluster 3, along with a few other countries; South Africa is part of this group. As in previous analyses, Cluster 1 consists of a mixed group of countries, most of which rely heavily on coffee export earnings. [4] These countries therefore do not seem to be concerned about market access, but rather about the oversupply of their main export products in the world market. Finally, we note that Cluster 10 is the “consensus” that includes not only the Harbinson proposal and the final agreement on modalities, but also about one third of the population living in WTO Member States. The distances shown in Table 4 show why cluster 10 is identified as a consensus. The consensus cluster is central to the WTO: five of the other 9 clusters of companies have the consensus cluster as the closest neighbours. We therefore believe that this should be treated as a media cluster surprisingly close to the African cluster, the Cairns Group, the free trade cluster (No.

6) and, to some extent, clusters of export prices and preferential treatment. Among the four former clusters plus consensus are two-thirds of the population affected by WTO membership, giving the outcome of the negotiations a sense of “morality”. In other words, both the draft proposal and the final agreement appear to be real efforts to find a compromise that corresponds to the positions of most WTO members and therefore strikes a balance between special positions and wishes. [5] We therefore come to the conclusion that the outcome of the negotiations is not the result of the strong armament of developing countries by rich countries, but that it seems to be in close agreement with the usual theory of public decision-making on logrolling and political negotiations in a democratic framework (e.g. B Tullock [1959, 1981]). 37 In short, countries adopt their three-dimensional negotiating positions, but in a slightly different way, whether they develop or develop. We find important effects of political ideology, insofar as left-wing governments in industrialized countries seem to support liberalisation along the export price dimension, while right-wing governments in developing countries support the dimension of liberalization, all the other things being the same. Nor do we find any trivial effects resulting from net food imports, the current level of agricultural aid in industrialized countries and the potential erosion of tariff preferences as a result of global liberalization.

However, the latter effect depends in part on the specific preferential agreement in which countries participate. In terms of the market access dimension, we also have some effect of having a democracy that works in developing countries. Finally, we note that the EU, in particular, is much less inclined to advance the dimension of liberalisation which, according to our hypothesis, is due to specific political-institutional provisions that make the EU`s position the lowest common denominator. 15. The consideration of these issues must also address the modalities of special and differentiated treatments, re-re-examining the wide range of proposals under consideration. One of the topics discussed is the proposal to improve the opportunities and conditions of access for agricultural products, which are of particular interest to participants in developing countries.